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Big Mother: The State's Use Of Mental 
Health Experts In Dependency Cases 
George J. Alexander* 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article centers on child dependency proceedings. It is 
designed principally to examine the use of mental health (psycho­
logical and psychiatric) professionals in that context. 1 Child 
dependency proceedings are the process by which the state 
examines allegations that children are abused, mistreated or subject 
to improper care. As a result of determinations made in these 
proceedings, parents may be required to reform their treatment and 
care of their children, may be temporarily deprived of custody, or 
may have their parental rights permanently terminated. 
There is some overlap in the use of mental health professionals 
in dependency and their use in other fields. Thus, after a brief 
statement of the rationale for the role of psychologists/psychiatrists 
in dependency proceedings, this Article will survey how such 
specialists have performed in other contexts. As a counterweight to 
the abuses in fields, such as testimony concerning the insanity 
defense, involuntary commitment and conservatorship, this Article 
notes the rise of criticism and attempts to moderate the impact of 
mental health testimony. 
Thereafter, this Article sketches the child dependency issues 
which regularly draw mental health expert testimony and evaluate 
the impact of such testimony. The Article reviews the literature on 
deficiencies in mental health expertise and practical pressures on 
experts which seem to make the use of testimony of psychiatrists 
'* B.A., J.D., University QfPennsylvania, LL.M., J.S.D. Yale, Professor of Law, Santa Clara 
University. The author thanks Professor Michael S. Wald for his helpful advice and his Research 
Assistants, Kathleen Howington and Denise E. Stich for their untiring assistance. 
1. The author hopes to addres other aspects of child dependency proceedings in later articles 
under the Big Mother umbrella. 
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and psychologists inappropriate for many of the issues in which it 
is routinely used. 
CHILD PLACEMENT AND THE CALL FOR 
PSYCHOLOGICAL/PSYCHIATRIC EXPERTISE 
It is clear that there is now, and has for a long time been, 
dissatisfaction with the resolution of child placement cases. While 
there is a long standing commitment to the overriding interests of 
children,2 there is no certainty about how best to insure that 
children are protected from abuse and neglect by their caretakers. 
Ubiquitous child abuse reporting laws insure that even merely 
suspicious circumstances be made known to the authorities.3 In 
consequence of these laws and other policies, numerous children4 
are processed by courts to determine whether they ought to be 
placed in homes other than their present ones, either permanently 
or merely for a short period in which to allow their caretakers to 
resolve any current problems and retake them. S Believing, as 
conventional wisdom has it, that bonding with a parent or substitute 
2. Concern for children has overridden the protection of the home in child pornography 
cases. It has conquered doctrines of free speech when children are part of the audience. It has 
justified a school system in which administrators are allowed to suppress literature, silence speech, 
and demand confonruty. As this Article will remind, it has overridden the rights of parents to raise 
their children. 
3. See generally Margaret H. Meriwether, Child Abuse Reporting Laws: Time for a Change, 
20 FAM. L. Q. 141 (1986), reprinted in DOUGLAS J. BESHAROV, PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT 9 (1988). 
4. See generally NATIONAL COMMITJE FOR PREVENTION OF CHILD ABUSE, CUR 
TRENDs IN CHiLD ABUSE REPoRTING AND FATALITIES (1990) (reporting the results of the 1989 
annual fifty state survey, which compares a total of 7.559 reports of sexual abuse to reporting 
agencies in 1976 with a total of 200,000 reported in 1986, the last year for which comprehensive 
national figures are available). 
5. CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE § 300(d) (West Supp. 1993 ). 
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caretaker is essential,6 laws typically provide a relatively short 
period in which to make fmal dispositional decisions.7 
The child placement process customarily involves a court, and 
may involve a number of attorneys. 8 Despite the number of 
attorneys attempting to resolve the custody issue, it is often 
impossible to ascertain uncontested accounts of the conduct of the 
child or of the child's caretakers.9 Since such issues are usually 
crucial to the resolution of dependency cases, a variety of experts 
are regularly employed to help the court. Of interest to this Article 
is the use of mental health professionals: psychiatrists and 
psychologists. Precisely because these professionals have a forensic 
role in the resolution of other types of legal issues, this Article will 
also address them. Whenever the expertise of mental health 
professionals is invoked, it is usually, as here, because there is a 
desire to have certain conduct evaluated or to obtain help in 
recreating the past or predicting the future conduct of one of the 
persons in whom the court is interested. 
If one could only mow more about an individual child's needs 
and the prospects for its development in alternative settings, that 
would help the dependency process a great deal. If only we could 
be sure which options would best serve the development of happy, 
healthy and productive adults, we might be inclined singlemindedly 
6. See JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTEREsTS OF THE CHILD 6 (1979) 
(Every child needs the Munbroken continuity of [an] affectionate stimulating relationship with an 
adult."); see also John Batt, Child Custody Disputes and Beyond the Best Interests Paradigm: A 
Contemporary Asesment of the GoldsteinfFreudjSomit Position and the Group 's Painter v. Bannister 
Jurisprudence, 16 NOVA L. REv. 621, 627-29 (1992) (discussing the MBeyond the Best Interests" 
paradigm involving the concepts of Mcontinuity" and Mpsychological parent"). 
7. See CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 3 19 (West 1984) (providing for a period not exceeding 
fifty days). 
8 .  In California, the law provides for resolution of the issues in court. CAL. WELl'. & mST. 
CODE §304 (West Supp. 1993) (court jurisdiction); id. § 317 (West Supp. 1993) (appointment of 
counsel). Therein, the county typically provides three attorneys (there may be more): a Deputy 
District Attorney, representing the child; a Deputy Public Defender, representing one or both of the 
caretakers (usually parents); and a third attorney, representing the social worker. Given the scarcity 
of resources in the entire procedure, the social worker's attorney sems a curious luxury. 
9. See, e.g. , Judge Leonard P. Edwards, The Relationship of Family and Juvenile Courts in 
Child Abuse Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 201, 201 -02 (1987). 
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to adopt them.10 Unfortunately, all general solutions appear to 
have substantial potential for harm. If only one could be certain 
about how good the parents of the child were in some more 
pervasive manner than simply whether they committed some 
alleged bad acts, that also would be of great help. Actually, 
certainty about specific acts in the past could, at least, advance the 
inquiry. Unfortunately, since the primary witnesses are young 
children, they may be unable to answer questions, and older ones 
may be relatively unreliable witnesses. 11 
The above combination of circumstances almost write a job 
description for an expert. As has been true of other aspects of the 
law with equally difficult questions, we have enticed mental health 
workers to provide that expertise. Thus, a number of issues are, 
thus, left for psychiatric/psychological testimony. 
SURVEY OF FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY/PSYCHOLOGY IN OTHER 
CONTEXTS 
Child dependency is not unique in its reliance on mental health 
specialists. Indeed, there appears to be an inverse relationship 
between the delegation of legal issues to psychological resolution 
and the ability to handle them with traditional tools. Unfortunately, 
the problems are so complex and varied that all attempts at bright 
line standards have failed to solye the problem. 12 
10. One of the sources of frustration in this field is the fact that coercive process applies 
almost exclusively to the poor. That suggests that many problems could be solved by wealth 
redistribution and, perhaps, that they will not be solved in its absence. 
' 1 1. See STEPHEN J. CEcr ET AL, CHILDREN'S EYEWITNESS MEMORY 2 10 ( 1987) (MChildren 
traditionally have been viewed as suspect eyewitnesses because of widely held perceptions that they 
are suggestible and can be easily manipulated, have difficulty distinguishing truth from fantasy, and 
are frequently uncooperative."). 
12. See generally Kathleen M. Quinn et aI., Resolved: Child Sex Abuse Is Overdiagnosed 29 
J. AM. ACAD. CHILD AND ADoLESCENT PSYClfiATRY 789 ( 1989) (stating that inadequate 
investigations lead to an overdiagnosis of child sexual abuse); Diana Younts, Eval/lating and 
Admitting Expen Opinion Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse, 4 1  DUKE LJ. 691 (199 1); Douglas J. 
Beshrov, Unfounded Allegations, A New Child Abuse Problem, PUBuc INTEREsT, Spring 1986, at 
18; L. B. Suski, Child Sexual Abuse: An Increasingly Imponant Part of Child Protective Service 
Practice, 3 PROTECrING CHILDREN 3 ( 1986); Roland C. Summit, The Child Sex/lal Ab/lse 
Accommodation Syndrome, 7 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 177 (1983); Robert J. Levy, Using 
"Scientific" Testimony to Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. L.Q. 383 ( 1989); Dirk Lorenzen, 
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Consider some other issues in which psychologicalJpsychiatric 
evidence is central to resolution. The insanity defense to crime, 13 
incompetency,t4 and institutionalization15 in mental health wards 
have the best developed relationship. To a lesser extent, insanity 
and incompetence are wild cards in most fields of law.16 It is 
difficult to reconcile legal norms with the absence of free will that 
has been associated with mental aberration. An accommodation to 
the logic that demands notice of the alteration of mental 
functioning by some has generally been provided by creating 
different rules for those who are mentally il or insane. 17 
Mental illness and insanity are, of course, quite different. They 
come from radically different sources, and accomplish funda­
mentally different ends. Mental illness is a claim that non­
conforming human conduct is the product of a process of being 
ill. 18 The term invites a "cure" response and, more importantly to 
law, implies a lack of responsibility on the part of the sick person. 
For mental health professionals, mental illness is an important 
concept because the heart of their professional preparation has been 
in "healing." 
This Article shall not rehearse the argument that mental illness 
is a myth,t9 as the literature on that point is extensive.20 Nor will 
Comment, The Admisibility of Expert Psychological Testimony in Cases Involving the Sexual Misuse 
of a Child, 42 U. MIAM[ L. REv. 1033 (1988). 
13. See Michael L. Perlin, Unpacking the Myths: The Symbolism Mythology of Insanity 
Defense Jurisprudence, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 599, 625 (1990). 
14. See generally Jan E. Rein, Preserving Dignity and Self-Determination of the Elderly in 
the Face of Competing Interests and Grim Alternatives: A Proposal for Statutory Refocus and 
Reform, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1818 (1992); George J. Alexander, Premature Probate: A Diferent 
Perspective on Guardianship for the Elderly, 31 STAN. L. REv. 1003 (1979) (hereinafter Premature 
Probate). 
15. RALPH RErSNE & CmuSTOPHER SLOBOGIN, LAw AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 
597-604 (2d ed. 1990). 
16. See infra notes 22-44 and accompanying text. 
17. See Seymour L. Halleck, M.D., PSYCHlATRY AND THE DILEMAS OP CRIME: A STUDY 
OP CAUSES, PuNISHMENT AND TREATMENT 210, 222 (1967) ("The most important reason for 
psychiatric participation in the criminal trial is a humanitarian zeal to temper the harshness of 
punishment."). 
18. See PAUL R. MCHUGH, M.D., THE PERSPECTIVES OF PSYCHlATRY 5 (1983). 
19. See THOMAS S. SZASZ, M.D., IDEOLOGY AND INSANITY 12-24 (1970). 
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this Article belabor the brooding question of the extent to which 
any human conduct is truly the product of free will, recognizing 
that the rationale for disparate treatment for the mad often 
expresses a belief that they are different in the extent of their 
control of their conduct. 21 It is unlikely that there will be a 
popular consensus on this point and, therefore, law must struggle 
with a system which at best accommodates to this necessary 
uncertainty. At best, one can hope for a pragmatic solution to 
current problems. 
In that regard, it is interesting to note the similarity of 
occasions where mental health professionals have been chosen to 
help the law resolve important issues, For example, take the 
insanity defense. In fact, the defense has little application to real 
life. It is urged in very few cases, and is unsuccessful in most of 
the ones in which it is asserted,22 Nonetheless, it comes in handy 
as a safety valve for the rigors of a legal system that is often seen 
as quite harsh, Many criminal defendants have committed crimes 
20. See THOMAS S. SZASZ, M.D., nm MY1H OF MENTAL IU.NEss 262 (rev. cd. 1974) (MMental iles is a myth. Psychiatrists are not concerned with mental illneses and their treatments. 
In actual practice they deal with personal, social and ethical problems of living."); nIOMAS S. SZASZ, 
LAw LmERTY AND PSYClUATRY 18 (1963) (M[P]sychiatric and sociological descriptions and 
explanations may offer promotive statements regarding the guised of cognitive assertions. In other 
words, while allegedly describing conduct, psychiatrists often prescribe it.") (emphasis in original); 
see also G. Gulevich & D. Bourne, Mental Illness and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND nIB STRUGOLE 
FOR ExISTENCE 27 (D. Daniels et aI. eds., 1970). Gulevich and Bourne conclude their review by 
commenting that Man individual with a label of mental illnes is quite capable of committing any act 
of violence known to man, but probably does not do so with any greater frequency than his neighbor 
in the general population." Id. at 323. See generally LE COLEMAN, nIB REION OF ERROR (1984). 
21. Moral theorists have identified four principal conditions tllat must be satisfied under the 
liberal paradigm before someone deserves moral blame for their conduct. A (1) moral agent must be 
implicated in (2) the breach of a moral norm that (3) fairly obligates the agent's compliance under 
circumstances where that (4) breach can be fairly attributed to the agent's conduct. Peter Arenelln, 
Character, Choice, and Moral Agency: The Relevance of Character to Our Moral Culpability 
Judgments, 7 Soc. PHIL. & POL'y 59, 60 (1990). Arenella writes: 
To qualify as a blameworthy moral agent, the individual must have the capacity to make 
moral judgments about what to do and how to be and the ability to act in accordance with 
such judgments. We view moral evil as a corruption of this human potential for moral 
concem,judgment and action. Thus, individuals do not deserve moral blame if they lack 
these moral capacities. 
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless. Reasesing the Relationship Between Legal and 
Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511, 1518 (1992). 
22. See William Bennet Turner & Beverley Ornstein, Distinguishing the Wicked /rom the 
Mentally Ill, CAL. LAw., Mar. 1983, at 42. 
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for reasons that society cannot honor, but that many can under­
stand. Some are driven by poverty to steal so as to provide food for 
themselves or their loved ones.23 Others are driven to rage by 
societal discrimination.24 We do not excuse crime because of such 
factors, but invariable conviction would also strike some as 
excessive when imposed on those whose conduct seems under­
standable. While it would be seen as frivolous to dismiss every 
hundredth case to show societal compassion, it is acceptable to fmd 
a very small number of persons legally irresponsible.2S No hann 
is done to the societal desire to punish because, quite commonly, 
the "acquitted" person is placed in a mental institution.26 Indeed, 
mental confmement may exceed the involuntary incarceration 
allowed by the penal system.27 At the same time, since the mental 
health system is defmed as therapeutic and not oriented toward 
punishment, the result leaves the appearance of compassion. It is 
difficult to imagine how differently the objects of that 
"compassion" view what is happening to them.28 
Using mental health professionals as the necessary experts in 
such cases also allows attorneys to wash their hands of the dubious 
conclusions elicited. Mental health experts are notoriously bad 
witnesses, and many lawyers have considerable luck in discrediting 
them in cross examination.29 In part, this is so because of the lack 
of reliability and validity of diagnoses discussed below. Experts can 
23. For a clasic example, see VICTOR HUGO, LEs MISERABLES (1862). 
24. See, e.g., George J. Church, The Fire this TIme, TiME, May II, 1992, at 18. 
25. This point is, of course, a limited one and depends on the absence of societal 
condemnation of the specific person chosen. When John Hinkley was acquitted by reason of insanity 
in the shooting of President Ronald Reagan, there was mas protest. 
26. HENRy STEADMAN, BEATING TIlE RAP IN TIlE REIGN OF ERROR ix (Lee Coleman ed., 
1979) (stating that every year thousands of citizens accused of crimes though not convicted by a 
court are confmed in mental institutions). 
27. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69 (1983). 
28. A client the author represented, Roy Schuster, was released from a state mental health 
facility because of constitutional inf1I1laries in his hospital incarceration. United States ex. rei 
Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir. 1969), cen. denied, 396 U.S. 847 (1969). In seeking 
certiorari, the state urged that the result would cause unmanageable dislocations. Apparently, when 
word of Schuster's release from the hospital spread through the institution, most of the inmates 
immediately sought to be retumed to prison in preference to remaining in therapy. 
29. See JAY ZISKIN, COPING WIn! PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TEsTIMONY 3 (1981). 
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easily be confronted by opposing expert testimony. When someone 
is acquitted, the psychiatrists can be blamed. 
Another legal problem in which mental health professionals 
play a large part is conservatorship (guardianship). Unlike the 
insanity defense, conservatorship proceedings are quite common. 30 
The stated goal of the procedure is to identify persons who are 
incompetent to handle their personal or financial affairs, and to 
provide a court appointed conservator (guardian) to act for them.31 
As the author has written on numerous occasions,32 conser­
vatorship proceedings, in fact, accomplish many other objectives 
because they control the ward's wealth. For example, these 
proceedings may provide support for children or may be a means 
of disadvantaging those who are not in the family but are receiving 
some of its assets.33 
Conservatorship criteria, like those in dependency, are rich in 
vague concepts. In conservatorship, often the chief criterion is 
mental illness itself.34 Some individuals are made wards expressly 
because of their old age,35 a concept not so much vague as it is 
cruel. 36 As with the application of the insanity defense, it would 
30. COMMISSION ON LEGAL PROBLEMS OF TIlE ELDERLY, AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, 
GUARDIANSHIP OF TIlE ELDERLY: A PRIMER FOR ArrORNEYS 1 (1990). 
31. See generally GEORGE J. ALEXANDER, WRITING A LIVING WILL: USING A DURABLE 
POWER-oF-ATI'ORNEY (1988). 
32. E.g., George Alexander, Avoiding Guardianship, 2 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 163, 164 
(1990); ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 25; George Alexander, Premature Probate: Who Benefits from 
Conservatorship?, 13 TRIAL 30, 32 (1977); GEORGE J. ALEXANDER & TRAVIS H. D. LEWIN, THE 
AGED AND TIlE NEED FOR SURROGATE MANAGEMENT 3 (1972). 
33. The plight of Ben Weingart is a good example. See ALEXANDER, supra note 31, at 2. 
34. E.g., CAL. WELF. & mST. CODE §§ 5350-5371 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (statutory 
procedures for Lantennan-Petris-Short (LPS) conservatorship for someone with a Mmental disorder 
or impairment by chronic alcoholism); see also Lawrence Friedman & Mark Savagc, Taking Care: 
The Law of Conservatorship in California, 61 S. CAL. L. REv. 273, 275 & n.4 (1988); cf. CAL. 
PROB. CODE § 1801(a),(b) (West 1991) (Conservatorship requires a fmding that the person lacks the 
ability to properly provide for Mhis or her personal needs for physical health, food, clothing, or 
shelter" and/or Mmanage his or her own fmancial resources or resist fmud or undue influence."). 
35. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 34, at 279. 
36. When the ABA Committee on Unifonn State Laws proposed to move its Unifonn 
Guardianship and Protective Proceedings Act for adoption by the House of Delegates, the ABA 
Commission on Legal Problems of the Elderly (of which the author was then vice-chair) unanimously 
(one ab�tention) opposed it because, if allowed, the declamtion of guardianship was based on the old 
age of the prospective ward. It also asked for time to debate the issue in the House of Delegates. It 
was not given time, and the House of Delegates adopted the provision summarily. When the 
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be difficult to achieve the desired results without taking advantage 
of there being people willing to ases decisions as being irrational 
irrespective of their surface reason. History attests to the fact that 
one need not be mad to have an affair, at least in the sense that 
there appear to have been many more affairs than could be 
accounted for by even the most pessimistic assessment of the 
degree of madness.37 It takes a mental health professional to 
classify certain sexual choices as the product of mental incapacity, 
thus having one partner placed in conservatorship, which does not 
incidentally rescue family resources from the outside influence.38 
In such cases, the expert's role is to "medicalize" what would 
otherwise be understood as perfectly human behavior. 
The bulk of those declared incompetent are relatively poor and 
powerless.39 This is not only true because a richer person's 
resources can often be marshalled to defeat the process, but even 
more so because relations rarely initiate proceedings against those 
who are still productive wage earners; presumably because they 
benefit more from sharing in income than they would by trying for 
a share of prior earnings. The conventional view of conservatorship 
proceedings is that they provide a private remedy. It was surprising 
to the author, when I first did field work, to find that the state was 
the most frequent petitioner.4o Later work has proven the state's 
dominant role to be typica1.41 At first, one wonders why that 
should be the case since usually, the state is not petitioning for 
incompetency for those who have wealth that they might 
mismanage. In fact, the wards are typically destitute. 42 
For those who are accustomed to using incompetency for 
family members who want to prevent waste of assets, the state's 
Commission persisted in its complaints, the ABA Committee on Unifonn Laws declared the age 
provision "optional." 
37. FRANK PITAN, M.D., ROMANIlC AFAIRS: TEMPoRARY INSANTIY 184 (1989) ("Many 
of us really do seem to believe that the best thing in life is the intense disorientation ('the picturesque 
unusualness') of being in love."). 
38. See supra note 33 and accompanying text 
39. ALExANDER & LEwIN, supra note 32, app. at 158 (Table 3). 
40. rd. app. at 157 (Table 1) (noting that 282 of 419 cases were instituted by the state). 
41. See Friedman & Savage, supra note 34, at 280. 
42. rd. at 280. 
1473 
HeinOnline -- 24 Pac. L. J.  1474 1992-1993
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 24 
interest is sometimes perplexing when pointed out. While it is still 
not clear to me how bringing such proceedings is routinely 
justified, it is at least obvious that creating a conservator-ward 
status creates great management efficiency for the state. The state, 
once it becomes the conservator, can make many decisions for the 
ward that may reduce the expense of his or her indigence. 43 
Perhaps a greater reason still is that conservatorship allows the 
state to assent in the name of the ward to its own procedures.44 
The dark side of involuntary commitment, much like 
conservatorship, provides another opportunity for taking action 
against the bothersome, but powerless. For example, in the criminal 
field, the involuntary commitment process allows locking up 
defendants against whom there is inadequate evidence for 
conviction.4s It is possible to combine civil commitment and 
criminal process by charging people with a crime, but having them 
incarcerated as incompetent to stand trial. If they are found 
incompetent to stand trial, they need not be convicted. While 
criminal law demands substantial evidence before anyone can be 
taken from the streets, many whose dangerousness is much more 
dubious can be placed in institutions for their supposed benefit and, 
of course, the benefit of the state. Thus, society has a useful 
mechanism for its own protection. 
This procedure has also been used to remove people who are 
not dangerous to society, such as people who are "in need of 
treatment" or suicidal. 46 Sometimes it even permits removing 
43. See, e.g., CAL. PROB. COOl! § 2900 (West Supp. 1993) ("The public guardi an may take 
immediate charge of the property within his county of persons referred to him for guardianship or 
conservatorship when such property is being wasted, uncared/or, or lost.") (emphasis added). See 
generally George Alexander, Premature Probate: Who Benefits From Conservatorship, 13 TRIAL 30, 
32 (1977). 
44. As these explanations are based on conjecture rather than empirical research, it would be 
interesting to study why conservatorship cases are brought 11/ the state. The study should include not 
only the stated reasons but also a tracing of the uses made of conservatorship once it is in stale 
hands. 
45. See Carol A.B. Warren, Involuntary Commitment/or Mental Disorder: Tlze Application 
o/California's Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, 1 1  LAw & Soc'Y 629, 631 (1977). 
46. Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment o/the Mentally Il, 87 HARV. L. REV. 
1 190, 1218-19 (1974). 
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otherwise powerful people from prominence.47 It obviously 
accomplishes two things simultaneously. First, it removes the 
incarcerated person from contact with the rest of the populace. 
Secondly, it stigmatizes, and thus minimizes, that person's 
utterances. 
The political use of psychiatry is easiest to appreciate in a 
totalitarian country. Thus, the example of the former Soviet Union 
proves particularly useful. There, the use of incarceration in mental 
hospitals in the service of the state's political ends became so 
notorious that the nation was threatened with expulsion from the 
World Psychiatric Association.48 Yet, if one examines the success 
of the Soviet practice, it becomes clear how useful it can be in 
achieving social goals. It should not surprise anyone that it has 
been used in this country against some prominent political figures 
in what appears to be a similar manner. Ezra Pound,49 General 
Walker and many others50 were removed from prominence 
through hospitalization. Others have made the point that the 
medical aspects of those cases (as opposed to their political facets) 
are extremely weak.51 There are a number of other cases of 
politically prominent figures who were disposed of behind the bars 
of institutions but, as in the other forms of alleged madness, the 
bulk of those disposed of have been relatively powerless. 
What makes involuntary commitment, especially commitment 
premised on danger to society, even more pernicious is the fact that 
the imprecision of diagnosis of future danger is so great that it 
47. See infra notes 49-51 and accompanying text. 
48. They resigned, instead. See Censure Soviets on Mind Abuses, BERKELEY GAZE'ITE, Sept. 
1, 1977, at 1. 
49. See THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE THERAPEUTIC STATE: PSYCHIATRY IN TIlE MIROR OF 
CuR EVENTS 138, 161-64 (1984) (describing the trial of Ezra Pound in which he was declared 
Minsane and mentally unfit for trial" and involuntarily committed as a mental patient for twelve 
years). 
50. Szasz names Secretary of State Forrestal, Governor Earl Long, Ernest Hemingway and 
Mary Todd Lincoln as persons removed from prominence through hospitalization in the United 
States. He also names Margo Krupp (wife of Fritz Krupp, the German industrial magnate) and Ignaz 
Semmelweis. [d. at 236-37. 
51. See id. at 18, 141, 178. 
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forces health professionals to overpredict dangerousness,52 thus 
locking up many who never prove to be a danger. 53 This aspect 
of mental health law stands in sharp contrast to the criminal law 
ideal of accepting the improper release of twenty guilty people if 
necessary to prevent the incarceration of a single innocent 
person.54 
While none of the legal principles sketched were expressly 
designed to accommodate state needs, it is apparent that they 
nonetheless do so. In general civil law, the state is usually more 
detached from the results. In fact, other than insuring that disputes 
can be settled justly and peacefully, the state may well be 
indifferent as to whether plaintiffs or defendants succeed in 
litigation. In civil litigation, the results of alleged mental illness are 
handled less consistently. In tort law, madness is largely 
irrelevant. 55 In contracts, it is sometimes exculpating.56 Foolish 
consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds when the state does not 
have its own needs. 
52. Bruce J. En & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: 
Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REv. 693, 7 11-16 (1974). 
53. Usually, there is no way to detennine whether those involuntarily placed are, in facl, more 
dangerous than the general population because no one is inclined to experiment wilh allowing 
dangerous conduct. On occasion, however, mandated release provides such an opportunity. In 
Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), the United States Supreme Court allowed the release of 
some prisoners who had clinically been delennined to be especially dangerous and not afforded a 
review of their commitment by jury trial because they were civilly committed after the tennination 
of a prison sentence. Id. at 110, 114-15. A follow up study tracking the men in question found tltern 
to be no more dangerous than the population at large. See generally Henry J. Steadman & Gary 
Koeles, The Community Adjustment and Criminal Activity o/the Baxtrom Patients 1966-1970, 129 
AM. J. PSYCHOL. 3 (1972). 
54. Researchers have found that psYchiatric predictions of dangerousness are often based on 
the psYchiatrist's desire to *play it safe." According to John Monahan, "[ilf one overpredicts violence, 
the resutt is that individuals are incarcerated needlessly. White an unfortunate and, indeed, unjust 
situation, it is not likely to have significant ramifications for the individual responsible for the 
overpredictions." John Monahan, The Prevention of Violence, in COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTIl AND 
TIlE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13 (lohn Monahan ed., 1975). 
55. See George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., Mental Ilness as an Excuse for Civil 
Wrongs, 43 N01RE DAME L. REv. 24, 28 (1967). 
56. George J. Alexander & Thomas S. Szasz, M.D., From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 
13 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 537, 538 (1973). 
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EFFECT OF STATE REGULATION ON FORENSIC 
PSYCHOLOGY/PSYCHIATRY 
There is also an economic side to the use of professional expertise 
which tends to entrench professional opinions. The apparently 
private aspect of diagnosis and healing of madness is a distinctly 
regulated industry. Not only does the practice of medicine require 
a license, it is probably the most expensive general license in the 
country. To become a physician, it is necessary to complete 
college, be admitted to and graduate from medical school, usually 
a four year process in this country, and then to complete a 
residence in medicine and, often, to do further work to be accepted 
into a specialty such as psychiatry. 57 
It is, consequently, understandable that there is pressure from 
those licensed to insure that their practice is monopolized by those 
with similar investments. It was inevitable that, when psychologists 
made a claim to participating in the healing of the "mentally ill," 
there was strong resistance from the organized medical 
association. 58 To this date, the physicians (psychiatrists) have the 
exclusive right to physical treatment such as surgery, electro­
convulsive therapy, injections of medicine and, usually, prescribing 
medicine. 59 They attempted to have exclusive access to the major 
source of health treatment resources, insurance, by having insurers 
require that all billing by psychologists go through physicians (who 
presumably exacted a monopolist's fee for the service). Antitrust 
57. See generally THE FEDERATION OF STATE MEDICAL BoARDS OF TIm UNITED STATES, A 
GUIDE TO TIm EsSENTIALS OF A MODERN MEDICAL PRACTICE ACT (1956). 
58. E.g., Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 468-69 nn.2, 4 (1982) (providing 
psychotherapy treatment under Blue Shield Plans). 
59. Medical practice acts are regulatory statutes that prohibit the practice of medicine by any 
person without a license. There are many language variations in the state laws, but they all contain 
similar provisions. They all provide for the creation of a board charged with the duty of examining 
applicants for medical licensure. C. JOSEPH STETLER ET AL., DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND TIm LAw 
15 (1962). 
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concerns for competition, however, blocked that use of monopoly 
power.60 
The inclusion of psychologists as suppliers of healing for those 
mentally ill did not radically affect the field except to the extent 
that the supply of healers was increased. The costs of credentials 
are almost as high as a physician's. To be a licensed psychologist 
generally requires a college education followed by admission to 
and graduation from a doctoral program in psychology and, 
usually, an extensive apprenticeship. 61 Thus, psychologists also 
have a substantial investment in keeping groups of prospective 
"patients" and, consequently, in characterizing those under 
discussion as mentally il. Furthermore, the high costs of entry has 
deprived these professions of substantial numbers of practitioners 
with contrarian perspectives. Once having earned licensure, their 
motivation to deny the utility of professional testimony is greatly 
diminished. 
The other group who influences the legal outcomes of claims 
of madness are attorneys. Attorney licenses, as most readers of this 
Article know, are also very expensive, and lawyers are no more 
anxious to share their market power with others than are 
psychiatrists and psychologists. Some mental health issues are cast 
in ways that uniquely fit legal skills. For a determination that 
someone is insane, as in the defense to crime, it is necessary to 
deal with such issues as lmowledge of right and wrong,62 capacity 
to form "intent, ,,63 and the causal relationship between mental 
state and the act in question.64 Such issues are understandably not 
ones that mental health professionals want to address. 
60. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478-79, 484-85 (1982) (holding that 
customer who received psychotherapy treatment from a Psychologist suffered sufficient injury under 
antitrust laws for not being able to recover payment from insurance company due to policy that 
reimbursement Vlould only be allowed if treated under a physician's referral). 
61 .  See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoDE § 2914 (West 1990). 
62. Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970): 
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 491 (1895); Daniel M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 719-
21 (1843). 
63. W. PAGE KEirN ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON TIlE LAW OF TORTS, § 135, at 1073 
(5th ed. 1984). 
64. Gcorge Anastaplo, Psychiatry and the Law: An Old-Fashioned Approach, in By REASON 
OF INSANITY: EsSAYS ON PSYCIDATRY AND TIlE LAw 167 (Lawrence Zelic Freedman ed., 1983). 
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Healing is regulated, but it is not necessarily performed in such 
regulated facilities as hospitals that can exclude unlicensed 
competitors. Law is exclusively enforced in regulated institutions 
and, while unlicensed advice may transgress on the preserve of 
attorneys, key resolutions must be achieved in (or sanctioned by) 
COurts.65 Thus, the legal profession may be more generous in 
sharing its definition of aberrant behavior with others, as it knows 
it retains monopoly control of outcomes. 
The mental health system, in general, is a system that reflects 
very traditional views, and is not structured to tolerate divergence 
of perspectives. It provides the sorts of previously mentioned 
societal management mechanisms.66 It has found resistance in well 
established civil rights and their spokespeople. Thus, after a history 
of unfettered use of the involuntary commitment mechanism, a 
procedural due process wave created some counterbalance. 67 
Advance directives have begun to counteract the threat of improper 
conservatorship. 68 The criminal system has been modified in 
minor ways to protect against improper intrusion of madness issues. 69 
65. E.g., CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1801-1803 (West 1991) (conservatorship); id. §§ 7000-12591 
(West 1991 & Supp. 1993) (administration of estates of decedents); CAL. av. CODE §§ 4350-4385 
(West 1983 & Supp. 1993) (dissolution of marriage); CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE § 300 (West SUpp. 
1993) (juvenile dependency). 
66. See supra notes 22-53 and accompanying text. 
67. The California Legislature enacted the Lantennan-Petris-Short Act, an example of 
legislation implementing due process refonns to involuntary commitment laws. CAL. WELP. & INST. 
CODE §§ 5000-5523 (West 1984 & SUpp. 1992). Carol Warren describes the refonn effort: 
The Lantennan-Petris-Short Act provides for two initial stages of involuntary civil 
commitment: a 72-hour hold for treatment and evaluation by mental hospital personnel, 
and a 14-day commitment period for a person who as a result of a mental disorder, is a 
danger to others, or to himself or gravely disabled. (LPS §§ 5150, 5250). It then 
authorizes additional commitments for mental disorder: 90 days (renewable for additional 
90-day periods) for persons dangerous to others (LPS §§ 5300, 5304); 14 days (not 
renewable) for persons dangerous to themselves, and a 3O-day temporary (LPS § 5352.1) 
and one-year subsequent (LPS § 5361) conservatorship which may be reviewed each year 
for persons gravely disabled (LPS § 5350). 
Warren, supra note 45, at 630. 
68. The use of advance directives for this purpose was f11'St suggested by me in Premature 
Probate. See Alexander, supra note 14, at 1027-33. 
69. See Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA StaTUum/s Relating to 
Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 Goo. WASH. L REv. 375, 386, 389-892 (1985) (discussing 
modifications such as allowing defense motions, discovery, and obtaining pretrial release despite the 
defendant's incompetence). Bennett refers to the chapter entitled Criminal Justice Mental Health 
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FORENSIC PSYCHIATRYjPSYCHOLOGY AND CHILD DEPENDENCY 
As applied to children in dependency cases, madness has a very 
significant role. In part, this role derives from the state's strong 
interest in protecting children. Not only does the state provide the 
normal range of protection through age neutral provisions of 
criminal law and its process, it also has established special criminal 
code sections that punish child abuse70 and provisions requiring 
many who would likely notice such abuses to report them.71 The 
state also provides express exceptions to standard privileges to 
assure that reports be made.72 In addition to criminal process, the 
state uses a civil procedure to take children from abusive parents, 
and to place the children elsewhere, often in foster care. The 
procedure is very broadly cast. In California, a juvenile court 
obtains jurisdiction on finding at least a substantial risk of non­
accidental physical harm by parents or guardians, or such harm by 
failure to adequately supervise, or that the child is depressed 
because of parental/guardian conduct. The above represents merely 
a few reasons sufficient to begin the process. Once the court has 
Standards which appears in ABA STANDARDS FOR CRiMINAL JUSTICE 2 (2d Supp. 1986). 
70. E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988) (failure to provide): id. § 271 (desertion of 
child under 14 with intent to abandon): id. § 271(a) (abandonment or failure to maintain child under 
14): id. § 273a (will cruelty or unjustifiable punishment of child: endangering life or health); id. 
§ 273d (corporal punishment or injury of child). See generally Lucy A. Younes & Douglas J. 
Besharov, State Child Abuse and Neglect Laws: A Comparative Analysis, in PROTECTING CHILDREN 
FROM ABUSE AND NEGLECT: POllCY AND PRACTICE 353, app. at 413-15 (Douglas J. Besharov cd., 
1988) (compiling state-by-state list of criminal sanctions for criminal acts against childrcn). 
71. E.g., Child Abuse and Neglect Reporting Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11164-11174.3 (West 
1992) (requiring reports by Kchild care custodians," Mhealth practitioners," and the Memployee of a 
child protective agency" among others). See generally Younes & Besharov, supra note 70, app. at 
357-58, 366-89 (describing state reporting law procedures). 
72. E.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 972(d)-(e)(1) (West Supp. 1993) (exception to marital privilege 
for dependency proceings or child of either spouse); id. § 985(a) (exception to privilege for 
confidential martial communications for crimes committed against a child of either spouse). See 
generally Younes & Besharov, supra note 70, at  409-10; Wayne F. Foster, Annotation, Competency 
of One Spouse to Testify Against Other in Prosecution for Offense Against Child of Both or Either, 
93 A.L.R. 3d 1018 (1979). 
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jurisdiction, the streamlined process of a dependency case 
begins.73 
Dependency cases dispense with a number of rules that 
otherwise apply to litigation. In California, to protect children from 
the glare of public proceedings, the hearings are not held in open 
court. The record is sealed.74 The principal report, by a social 
worker, is admitted into evidence despite its recitation of hearsay, 
and may, in fact, provide the principal evidence used to determine 
jurisdiction. Thus, evidence otherwise inadmissible may, in fact, be 
determinative.75 All of these practices are based on the desire to 
protect children as well as the inherent limitations in the sort of 
case the state would be able to bring if criminal law standards or 
their equivalent were imposed.76 
In dependency proceedings, a crucial issue often is presented 
through psychological or psychiatric evidence. If child abuse has 
been alleged, professional testimony wiil quite regularly be used to 
establish the fact of the abuse having occurred and the identity of 
the perpetrator.77 Such testimony is often necessary in dependency 
cases because the child victim is too young to testify.78 Other 
issues also call for mental health expertise. Whether the caretaker 
will be a threat to future care of the child, whether she is an 
alcoholic or uses drugs, and how responsible she is in general are 
issues of this sort. Indeed, in California, there are specific grounds 
for granting a change of caretaker when the parents are 
73. E.g. CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§ 300-395 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (jurisdiction and 
procedure statutes for dependency). See generally Younes & Besharov, supra note 70, at 358-60, 
403-12. 
74. E.g. , CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§ 389, 826-830 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (statutory 
procedures for destruction, release, and sealing juvenile court records). See generally Younes & 
Besharov, supra note 70, at 397-400. 
75. See In re Malinda, 51 Cal. 3d 368, 376, 795 P.2d 1244, 1247,272 Cal. Rptr. 787 (1990). 
76. See Robert J. Levy, Using "Scientific" Testimony To Prove Child Sexual Abuse, 23 FAM. 
L. Q. 383, 385-86 (1989); Michael Fine, Comment, Where Have All the Children Gone? Due Process 
and Judicial Criteria for Removing Children from Their Parents' Homes in California, 21 Sw. U. 
L. REV. 125, 126-28 (1991). 
77. See Veronica Serrato, Note, Expert Testimony in Child Abuse Prosecutions: A Spectrum 
of Uses, 68 B.U. L. REv. 155, 166 (1988). 
78. See Susan B. Apel, Custodial Parents, Child Sexual Abuse, and the Legal System: Beyond 
Contempt, 38 �. U. L. REv 491, 496-97 (1989). 
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incompetent to raise the child.79 A finding under that provision 
expressly requires taking the testimony of a mental health 
professional. 80 
Current dependency procedures are certainly zealous. One 
cannot doubt that the state has expressed its concern for the welfare 
of children. It has streamlined procedure, coerced information 
through compulsory reporting laws and waiver of privilege, and 
provided for secret and informal testimony in assessing the relevant 
facts. It often fmds claims of innocence as merely proof that the 
child is endangered. 81 
A recent Grand Jury in San Diego called its system "out of 
control. .,82 The Grand Jury estimated that up to sixty percent of 
the cases that resulted in removing children from their homes 
should not have been decided as they were. It is difficult to 
79. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992). This section, in pertinent part, provides: 
An action may be broUght for the purpose of having any child under the age of 18 years 
declared free from the custody and control of either or both of his or her parents when the 
child comes within any of the following descriptions • • .  (6) [w]hose parent or parents are 
mentally disabled and are likely to remain so in the foreseeable future. 
Id. See generally Paul Berstein, Termination of Parental Rights on the Basis of Mental Disability: 
A Problem in Policy and Interpretation, 22 PAC. LJ. 1 155 (1991) (criticizing broad judicial 
interpretation of the provision). 
80. CAL. CIv. CODE § 232(a)(6) (West Supp. 1992) ("'The evidence of any two experts, cach 
of whom shall be either a physician and surgeon, • . •  or a licensed psychologist • • •  shall be required 
to support a rmding under this subdivision."). 
81 .  The Grand Jury reports: 
If the [dependency] court believes a molest occurred and the family member could have 
been responsible a "true lmding" is made and wardship declared. If a father denies molest 
and a true lmding is made, he suffelS the ultimate Catch-22 - he can either admit and 
take a chance that the department will allow him to begin reunification with his family 
or he can deny and no reunifcation will occur. 
But the irony does not end there. If the spouse supports her husband's denial, she 
canot be trusted to protect the child and she too will not be allowed to reunify with the 
child., 11 current IlSseruon is that the mother must have known all along and failed to 
protect. That then becomes a protective issue and reason to remove the child from the 
mother. 
Still worse, if the child denies the molest, this can be seen as part of a "child abuse 
accommodation syndrome and an additional reasons why the child should have no contact 
with the parents . . . •  Thus, all members of the family can deny a false molest allegation 
and, in each instance, the system uses the denial as evidence of guilt. 
SAN DIEGO COUNTY GRAND JURY, CmLD SEXUAL ABUSE, ASSAULT, AND MOLEST ISSUES, Report 
Nos. 8, 2, 3 (June 29, 1992) (citation omitted). 
82. Leonard Bernstein, Social Workers Lookfor a Solution, L. A. DMES, Feb. 8, 1992, IIt B l .  
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evaluate this report.83 Even assuming that it was correct as to the 
current situation in San Diego, there is no assurance that San Diego 
is representative of programs in other cities. 
. 
Some general questions do suggest themselves, however. The 
preeminent one appears to be whether the dependency process 
provides better protection for children than would occur in its 
absence. That, in turn, requires an assessment of the adequacy of 
the criminal system that punishes child abuse independently. It also 
requires a judgment of the cost, psychological and fmancial, paid 
by children who are forcibly removed from the homes of parents 
who have not abandoned them, and by their parents. One should 
also recognize the societal costs of providing the procedure and its 
enforcement, and inquire whether those funds could better be spent 
in counselling children and parents. 
After accounting for the costs of having a process, one must 
evaluate the likely improvement when children are removed from 
their parents and placed in foster or other alternative care. To do 
this, one would need to know the accuracy . of decisions in 
dependency cases.84 Just as there are many anecdotes concerning 
the serious plight of children being raised by abusive parents, so 
there are others about terrible foster care arrangements.85 Only if, 
on balance, it seems likely that foster care will be superior to the 
care of what are almost always natural parents should it be 
attempted. The law assumes that the process is concerned with 
ultimately improving the home environment for children. In theory, 
the law uses the dependency process as an intermediate step to 
ultimate reunification; however, substantial dislocations are 
involved in both the interim separation and the supervision of 
reunification. In fact, many children are not reunited with parents 
who want them. 86 
83. Bernstein, supra note 82, at Bl. 
84. If, for example, the San Diego Grand Jury is correct that more child removal cases are 
inappropriate than appropriate, that would seem to suggest a clearly negative answer. 
85. See Fine, supra note 76, at 128-29 & n.2S. 
86. See Margaret Beyer & Wallace J. Mlyniec, Lifeline to Biological Parents: Their Effect on 
Termination of Parental Rights and Permanence, in PROTECTING CHn.DREN FROM ABUSE AND 
NEGLECT: POUCY AND PRACTICE 166 & n.30 (Douglas J. Besharov ed., 1988). 
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The most pressing question, however, would appear to be 
whether the process is worth the personal costs for all involved. 
Several factors suggest it might not be. First, children need both 
attachment to parental figures and permanence in relationships as 
part of growing up well adjusted.87 Second, parents are usually 
strongly emotionally attached to their children, and their anguish at 
having them removed must be considered as well. 
In viewing the system as it functions in California, several 
questions leap to mind. First, one must consider whether a process 
that is so deprived of resources can be expected to work well. 
Currently, the attorneys and social workers involved in the 
dependency process have a staggering number of simultaneous 
cases.88 Even if there were no overload, one is left to wonder how 
the decisions could be correctly resolved given the complexity of 
the question of alternative parenting of small children. So many 
intangible considerations affect good parenting that the 
responsibility for finding substitute parents is daunting. 
Second, one is also led to reexamine the law's rejection of so 
many safeguards of the criminal justice system. It cannot be true 
that society lacks zeal in eradicating crime, thus there must be 
reasons other than softness on crime that explain why criminal 
defendants enjoy so many protections that accused parents do 
not.89 If there is concern that innocent people not be criminally 
convicted, why is there not concern that innocent parents are 
deprived of their children? While one can easily agree that children 
87. See GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 6, at 6 (every child needs the "unbroken continuity of 
[an] affectionate and stimulating relationship with an adult. j; see also Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 
86, at 164-65 (stresg that preserving the relationship to the "biological" parent should be given 
greater attention because of its importance in child development). 
88. See, e.g. , William W. Patton, Forever Tom Asunder: Chartering Evidentiary Parameters, 
the Right to Competent Counsel and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in California Child 
Dependency and Parental Severance Cases, 27 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 299, 300 n.l (1987) (noting 
that, in 1985, 17,913 child abuse or neglect proceedings were instituted in Los Angeles). 
89. See Levy, supra note 76, at 385·87 & n.I3 (discusing how dependency proceedings do 
not include a requirement for prof beyond a reasonable doubt, !l fedeml constitutional right to 
counsel for indigent parents, and the right to confront all witnes due to special hearsay provisions); 
see also Patton, supra note 88, at 303-51 (discussing differences in the right to counsel, priVilege 
against self-incrimination, and the rules governing admissible evidence in dependency proceedings). 
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should be protected, why is there not equal solicitude for the 
predictable victims of future crimes? 
In the fmal analysis, cases that do not appear to involve 
ongoing physical or sexual abuse, which could be established in 
criminal court, turn on difficult questions of how to evaluate prior 
conduct and how to predict future conduct. Not surprisingly, these 
questions are delegated to social workers.9O Social workers, in . 
turn, often use psychologists or psychiatrists to make such 
decisions.91 
While the process leaves many brooding doubts about which 
the author hopes to comment in future installments, this Article 
focuses on the portion that involves mental health professionals. As 
in other matters of law in which they have allowed themselves to 
be embroiled, mental health professionals bring dubious clarity to 
the difficult problems in child dependency. In a sense, it is curious 
that this point must be made so often in so many contexts. Civil 
commitment, the largest mental health related field in the middle 
of this century, suffered all of the vagaries of mental health 
testimony for a long time before the reformers of the sixties 
convinced legislatures how unreliable and invalid psychiatric 
testimony was likely to be.92 While current law still relies 
excessively on such testimony, some safeguards are in place to 
counteract its impact and to assure that psychiatric prediction and 
recreation of the past are not alone sufficient to incarcerate people 
for indefinite periods.93 Despite that fact, the use of mental health 
opinions in child placement cases appears to be innocent of any of 
90. See CAL. WELP. & INST. CODE §§ 272, 280-281 (West 1984 & Supp. 1992) (provisions 
allowing social workers to prepare social study report); Fine, supra note 76, at 127, 138 (stating that 
judges depend mainly on social workers to make dependency decisions). 
91.  See Edwards, supra note 9, at 226 (MEvaluations are often provided by medical or 
psychological experts utilized by the investigators."). 
92. SAMUEL 1. BRAKE!. & RONALD S. ROCK, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND TIlE LAW, 55-59 
(1971). 
93. See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing due proces safeguards); see also 
Grant H. Morris, The Supreme Court Examines Civil Commitment Issues: A Retrospective and 
Prospective Asesment, 60 TUI.. L. REv. 927, 933-36 (1986) (discussing O·Conner v. Donaldson, 
422 U.S. 563 (1975». 
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the doubts that affected comparable testimony in mental 
hospitalization. 
Are there factors in child placement that make it likely that 
mental health expertise is more appropriate to this field? It is not 
likely that psychological predictions of future behavior are any 
better here than in other relationships. For example, whether a 
father is likely to abuse his children, be violent in their presence, 
or inadequately provide for his children's needs is no clearer to a 
professional than whether a person accused of being mentally ill 
will be dangerous in the future--the clearest example of unreliable 
psychiatric testimony.94 Indeed, a professional cannot improve on 
the fmdings of a non-psychologist investigator in determining what 
has happened in the home in the past. 
On the other hand, unlike her role in the problems of adults, a 
properly trained expert may be able to inform a court about how 
well adjusted a child is in its present setting, and whether any 
psychological problems may require treatment.9S Without 
considering whether maladjustment is a disease that these experts 
are qualified to treat, it, at least, is a matter that relates to their 
training and experience. Their opinion may well provide one factor 
that would be useful to the courts in making a placement decision. 
One should not confuse this comment with a suggestion that the 
testimony might also indicate which parent made the child happier 
or whether one or the other performed specific acts, good or bad. 
As the last section of this Article demonstrates, those issues are 
well beyond the ability of experts. 
Furthermore, in many child placement cases, even though the 
child is the party most interested in a proper outcome, the child is 
often unable to assist directly in its resolution. Young children may 
not understand or be able to communicate important facts.96 Some 
facts may be unduly upsetting to youngsters.97 This obvious 
problem has created great frustration in a system attempting to 
94. See En & Litwack supra note 52, at 699-708, 71 1-16. 
95. See Edwards, supra note 9, at 227. 
96. JOHN B.B. MEYERS, CHILD WITNESS LAw AND PRAcnCE §§ 3.1-3.28 (1987). 
97. It!. §§ 2.10, 4.2. 
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assist children. It may be appropriate to call on mental health 
workers to report the state of knowledge concerning victim silence 
or other behavior. For example, it is useful for a jury to know that 
a molestation victim may not want to talk about the events for one 
of several reasons.98 It is useful to report that unusually disruptive 
behavior may be linked to conflict within a child.99 The 
temptation is, of course, to press an additional step and invite the 
worker to testify that a given silence indicates a specific child's 
h�ving been abused or that disruptive behavior is the equivalent in 
any given case of testimony of harm caused by the primary 
caretaker. 
The latter testimony would be much more decisive. On the 
other hand, it is precisely the type of information that the worker 
is unable to provide accurately. Even if the worker could 
understand the past by observing present child behavior or could 
elicit a story from the child after establishing a relationship with 
her, several very serious problems would attend such an effort. 
Prescinding from the lack of scientific basis for the finding and a 
pattern of excessive certainty about conclusions, what is ultimately 
elicited is essentially what would not have been admitted in the 
first place: The impressions of a small child about its surroundings 
and about traumatic events in its life. It seems strange to have a 
high threshold of testimonial competency for young children and 
then to admit a version of their stories sifted through still another 
mind. 
Even if the mental health worker is totally neutral, the 
testimony is untrustworthy but there is no reason to expect 
neutrality since most of the workers who participate in the 
dependency process do so regularly. 100 Consequently, they are 
likely to have expectations of outcome derived from prior cases. 
After deciding that a number of prior children were abused by their 
fathers, for example, the next father seen will more likely be found 
98. See id. § 4.9 (describing how to deal with delays in reporting sexual abuse). 
99. [d. §§ 4.15, 4.17 (describing how to use the MsexuaUy abused child syndrome" to bolster 
credibility of a victim). 
100. See Levy, supra note 76, at 390. 
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to have also abused the child even though the evidence is much 
weaker. 101 Confounding that problem, mental health workers as 
a group are quick in making a decision and surprisingly confident 
in their conclusions. 102 
So far, the author has assumed a lack of intentional bias in the 
decision. In life, unfortunately, that is often unrealistic. Those who 
are paid for their testimony are doubtless influenced by the 
viewpoint of those who pay for their services. Of course, that is to 
some extent true of all paid experts. The difference between mental 
health experts and others lies in the fact that so much less certainty 
attends the sort of information they present. 
Beyond the possible distraction of one's client's interests, 
mental health workers are also subject to broader pressures. As is 
the fmding of "dangerousness" in the involuntary commitment 
cases, testifying that a given parent presents problems is relatively 
safe. If the testimony results in denying child custody, the expert 
will never be proven wrong. If custody is granted or retained 
anyway, and nothing untoward happens, it simply means that the 
alleged culprit is on guard as a result of the expert testimony and 
the scrutiny it has brought. On the other hand, if the expert 
testimony makes the custodian out as well qualified, and the 
custodian subsequently strikes the child or has sexual relations with 
it, the psychologist/psychiatrist will be blamed. 
One must also consider political correctness as public attitudes 
about child abuse matters change. Recently, far fewer complaints 
have been made, presumably because of the conventional wisdom 
that child complaints about abuse were mostly incorrect and that 
children simply invented such stories.103 Now, at least as far as 
fathers sexually abusing their female children is concerned, the 
claim is popularly conceived of as true even though the data is 
101. Donald N. Bersoff, Judicial Deference to Nonlegal Decisionmakers: Imposing Simplistic 
Solutions on Problems of Cognitive Complexity in Mental Disability Lalli, 46 SMU L. REV. 329, 341 
n.51 (1992) (citing a study which concludes that clinicians from state mental hospitals arc likely to 
overestimate the number of paranoid schizophrenics in hospitals and to overdiagnose paranoid 
schizophrenia). 
102. Id. at 347 n.83. 
103. See generally, Arthur H. Green & Diane H. Schetsky, True and False Allegations of Child 
Sexual Abuse in Child Custody Disputes, 2S I. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 449 (1986). 
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scanty.l04 No data suggests that there has been any substantial 
change in the actual rate of such conduct, lOS and I doubt that 
there has. Given the public preference to believe that fathers are 
abusers, that testimony will be better accepted than its opposite. 
Thus, there is yet another reason making it preferable to come to 
one conclusion as opposed to the other. 
Finally, and perhaps most perniciously, social class may 
provide pressure. Dependency cases do not exclusively relate to 
children of the underclass. Nonetheless, they so often concern 
children of poor families106 that it is not much of an 
overstatement to consider this branch of law uniquely focused on 
the children of poverty. In some part, the' selection of cases is 
influenced by the fact that many of the children are called to the 
attention of state officers because they are on welfare rolls.107 In 
part, children of richer parents can be siphoned from the system by 
satisfactory private contractual arrangements for child care. I doubt 
that those factors and other neutral ones sufficiently explain the 
selection of cases. Many, I suspect, are the product of society's 
greater eagerness to supervise the powerless. At least, they are 
explained by the fact that the poor are less able to marshall 
resources to resist the forces of the government. 
Once dependency proceedings are initiated, parents are given 
strict prescriptions for their lives should they want their children 
back. They must be drug free and limit the use of alcohol. Their 
homes must be clean and orderly, and they must adequately 
provide for the children's needs and wants. lOS Sometimes, the 
104. [d.; see also Levy, supra note 76, at 387. 
105. See Levy, supra note 76, at 387-88 & nn. 21-22 (discussing data showing that while report 
rate of child sexual abuse has increased, so has the number of faIse or unsubstantiated allegations, 
usually in divorce custody disputes). 
106. See Roy H. Pelton, Child Abuse and Neglecl: The Myth o/Clnslessness, in THE SOCIAL 
CONTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT 23, 24-30 (Leroy H. Pelton ed., 1981). 
107. See id. at 26-27 (noting that reports of child abuse among poor people may be influenced 
by fact they are subject to Mpublic scrutinyM by receiving welfare). But see id. at 29, 36 (arguing that 
the higher rate of child abuse is more due to the effects of poverty than being subject to public 
scrutiny). 
108. See Beyer & Mlyniec, supra note 86, at 167-68. 
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sheer burden of the requirements, such as required classes, 109 
makes it impossible for parents to qualify. Of course, the social 
workers who administer the system are typically middle class, as 
are their mental health worker colleagues,uo The author gets the 
uncomfortable feeling that some of the evidence is based on a 
general notion that children deserve to be elevated from their lower 
class lives to something more approaching the lives of those who 
testify about them. Mental health workers have been asked to fill 
in gaps in information by examining the actions of young children 
and deducing "abnormalities" from them. In their assessment of 
norms, it is critical whether mental health workers consider lives 
of impoverishment normal for poor people. Otherwise, achieving 
the norm will simply have to be accomplished by taking the 
children from the parents and placing them somewhere where there 
are more adequate resources. 
Regardless of the parent's social class, one need not 
accommodate violence or child neglect. If the issues of deprivation 
are clearly presented to the judge, the judge can distinguish 
between instances in which the child is deprived of necessary 
support by parents who have enough funds to do better, and cases 
in which parents not providing ideally for the child are limited by 
their available resources. The latter clearly does not warrant 
removing the child from its home in any but the most appalling 
circumstances. The same standard must apply when there is a 
problem, such as drug use or alcoholism, but the problem has been 
eradicated. That appears often not to be the case. Once the state 
starts imposing conditions on wayward parents, it commonly strays 
from those designed to assure that the original problem is solved 
109. The San Diego Grand Jury report notes that reunification plans will invariably require that 
the offending spouse complete Parents United. SAN DIEGO GRAND JURY, supra note 81, at 3. If drug 
use or excessive use of alcohol is allcged, the parents are customarily required to attend the program 
appropriate to their problem as well. Most, but not all, support services are paid for by the state 
without parental reimbursement. Edwards, supra note 91, at 226. 
1 10. Stuart Butler, A Conservative 's War on Poverty; Razing the Liberal Plantation, NAT'L 
REv., Nov. 10, 1989, at 27 ("The Great Society spawned a vast middle-clas poverty industry: public 
housing managers, social workers, job-training specialists, day-care providers, and the like.") . 
1490 
HeinOnline -- 24 Pac. L. J.  1491 1992-1993
1993/ State's Use Of Mental Health Experts In Dependency Cases 
to other issues insuring "better" parenting.111  The ability of 
parents to accommodate the latter appears often to be overlooked 
as an issue. 1 12 
Once one departs from descriptions of behavior that can be 
readily understood by the judge and views the child's welfare from 
the standpoint of its psychological well being, there is considerably 
less necessary focus on the economic implications. The judge may 
accept the conclusion without recognizing its foundation. 
EVALUATING PSYCHIATRICjPSYCHOLOGICAL EXPERTS 
Studies of psychological/psychiatric testimony have 
demonstrated some facts with amazing consistency. Mental health 
workers are notoriously unreliable. In their inability to fmd a 
language that communicates with others in their field, they make 
it very difficult to share experience. The studies are legion in which 
diagnoses were found unreliable.113 While the profession 
continues to hope that the next iteration of their core work, the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), will 
Ill .  One author notes that social workers often recommend services such as mental health and 
parenting education classes that are not acceptable to the parents or needed and criticizes agencies 
for not directing resources at the parents' perceived needs for adequate housing, increased income, 
medical care, and day care. Cecilia E. Sudia, What Services Do Abusive and Neglected Families 
Need?, in THE SOCIAL CoNTEXT OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGlECT 268, 280-83 (Leroy H. Pelton ed., 
1981); see also LEROY H. PELTON, FOR REAsONS OF POVERTY 172 (1989). 
1 12. NIGEL PARTON, THE POLITICS OF CHILD ABUSE 196 (1985) (noting that the Mfmancial cost 
of maintaining parental contact" should not be overlooked when a child is removed from the home). 
113. See generally David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expen Witness in Psychology and 
Psychiatry, 241 SCIENCE 3 1, 31 (1988) (referring to studies that show disagreement of experienced 
psychiatrists over diagnosis, succes of military recruits despite pSYchiatrists' recommendation for 
discharge, and the inability of clinicians to separate persons with actual brain damage from those with 
simulated brain damage). 
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cure the problem, there is little reason to believe that it will do 
SO.114 Similar claims about the predecessor volumes failed.lls 
Without reliability, the ability to call the same condition by the 
same name, there is no hope of knowing whether diagnoses are 
valid, that is, whether they actually identify disorders. As has been 
pointed out, mental health workers, despite these facts, make 
diagnoses very quickly compared to physicians in other fields, and 
have great confidence in their correctness. 1 16 Furthermore, once 
mental health workers have formed an impression, it is difficult to 
convince them of altematives. 1 l7 In that regard, they may not 
differ greatly from the general population. The use of their 
testimony is not inappropriate because it is likely to be less 
accurate than the assessment of other witnesses. Rather, it is 
inappropriate because it is likely to be given greater weight than 
that of lay people. Testimony is likely to be expressed in scientific 
terms that make it easier to accept, and in which the judge may be 
more reticent to challenge. 
Serious problems exist in making the diagnoses reliable. For 
example, the psychologist's or psychiatrist's repeated exposure to 
child abuse is permanently likely to increase his or her propensity 
to fmd such abuse.l l8 Stereotypical factors, such as certain kinds 
of drawings by children, are assumed to relate facts in a manner 
wholly unwarranted by data on their validity, ..9 Interviewing is, 
itself, a notably unreliable technique for prediction, but it is, 
1 14. [d. at 31-32. Faust and Ziskin wrote: 
Psychiatry has been continuously plagued by difficulties in achieving reliable 
classification. The American Psychiatric Association has revised the official diagnostic 
manual at a quickened pace. The f11'St Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental 
Disorders (DSM-l) was published in 1952, DSM-II in 1968, DSM il in 1980, and DSM­
II-Revised in 1987. The next revision, DSM-IV, is slated for publication . . • •  
The initial DSM-il field trials appeared to demonstrate improved diagnostic 
reliability, but serious methodological shortcomings raised doubts about the results. 
[d. at 31. 
1 15. [d. at 31, 32. 
1 16. Bersoff, supra note 101, at 347 & nn. 82-83. 
1 17. [d. at 347 n.83. 
118.  Bersoff, supra note 101, at 340-41. 
1 19. [d. at 342. 
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nonetheless, greatly relied upon by mental health professionals. 120 
It should also be remembered that clinicians are taught to focus on 
their patient's sUbjective reality. When they change focus to 
objective reality, they perform far more poorly. 121 One would 
expect clinicians to improve in their assessments with experience 
in the field or education, and, as a group, they certainly think they 
do. In fact, they do not. 122 
When an impressionable child is brought to a mental health 
clinician, there is yet another problem that may result. After the 
sessions between child and therapist, it may be difficult to fmd out 
which way the information passed. It is likely that the child 
presented some information to the therapist that becomes part of 
the therapist's report. But there are no safeguards against the 
therapist having brought the information into the relationship. 123 
It has been pointed out that, despite evidence against its validity, 
mental health workers tend to trust their conclusions doggedly.124 
At some point, they may discover that truth as they believe it to 
exist is not mirrored by what the child relates to them. 
When adult patients fail to agree with their therapists, 
psychological terms help the therapist explain that the patient is 
120. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the Psychology of Prediction, 80 PSYCHOL. REv. 
237, 249 (1973). 
121. Faust & Ziskin. supra note 1 13, at 32. 
122. It is yet another way to recognize the limitations of their work to note that, in a recent 
study of profesionals who specialize in assesments of brain behavior, there was no significant 
difference in accuracy between two groups. The members of one group had almost 25 times as much 
experience as the members of the other. ld. 
123. It is difficult to produce examples in this field given the secrecy of hearings and sealing 
of records. A set of cases were reported in Report No. 8 of the San Diego Grand Jury Report. SAN 
DIEGO GRAND JURY, supra note 8l. They are used in this article merely as concrete examples of the 
problem. No claim is made that they are representative. Each of the cases identified were examples 
of the system's abuse. One case was spotlighted because there was conclusive evidence of parental 
innocence. It was the subject of a separate, more detailed report. 
A daughter of a military father was raped, and he was accused of having been the rapist. He 
denied the charge and was joined in the denial by the steadfast asertion of his eight-year-old 
daughter, Alicia, that a stranger raped her. Alicia was removed from the home while the case 
progres. After what the Grand Jury descn'bed as 13 months of prodding by a psychologist, Alicia 
was wilg to admit that her father was the rapist. After two and one half years, the Department 
fmally tested the semen sample they had kept. It was incompatible with the father's semen. A 
REPoRT OF TIlE 1991-92 SAN DIEGO CoUNTY GRAND JURY, THE CASE OF ALIcIA W., Report No. 
6 (June 23, 1992). 
124. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. 
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wrong. She may be seen as projecting her own problems or 
denying reality, to illustrate two professional buzzwords. Indeed, 
the vocabulary of mental illness is almost entirely comprised of 
different diseases or abnormalities to explain that there is 
something untrue or inappropriate about the patient's ideas and 
conduct. It is the role of some forms of therapy to make the patient 
aware of these distortions and to help the patient overcome them. 
Once a therapist has decided that the therapist knows the truth and 
the child denies it, it may seem appropriate to insure that the child 
gains insight into its error. l25 Such sessions create the obvious 
danger that the therapist will ultimately convince the child, and 
then will report the newest version to the court. Short of that, 
professionals commonly report their own notions as the truth and 
give the contradiction short shrift. 
A perhaps less obvious result of sessions of the sort just 
mentioned is their impact on the child, and, since this Article 
concerns dependency cases, the child's later testimony. If the 
mental health worker has been active in seeking the child's 
reconsideration of events, what will emerge later? Will it be the 
child's true perception of events? Will it be the child's adopted 
story taken from the therapist? Will it be some amalgam? Can 
anyone be certain? At least, the intermingling of the therapists 
ideas with the child's will leave later testimony ripe for harsh cross 
examination centered on making recollection out as having been 
manipulated. The use of experts might thus jeopardize the later use 
of the child's testimony. 
The opposite is, of course, also quite possible. A child may 
well be pretending abuse when none has occurred. This could be 
the result of a rich fantasy life, comments made by an older 
sibling, or anger for one of the many things that parents do in 
raising children. Would the mental health worker mow that the 
injury was falsified? Probably not. Several studies make the same 
point: Clinicians are poor at detecting malingering even when they 
are expressly looking for it.126 When they are not led to look for 
125. See REISNER & SLOBIGIN, supra note 15, at 597-604. 
126. Bersoff, supra note 101, at 368, 369; Faust & Ziskin, supra note 1 13, at 32. 
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it, results are, of course much worse. In a now famous study, the 
experimenter asked children to lower their test performance. He 
then showed the results to appraisers asking for their diagnosis, and 
most found the results abnormal and diagnosed the test takers as 
being brain damaged. Although malingering was listed as one of 
three possible causes, not a single practitioner chose that correct 
result. 127 
Not only does the use of mental health professionals lead to 
additional expense, the potential for error and other problems, it 
also expressly substitutes for the litigational system. There are 
many problems in litigation, but as Professor Bersoff points out, a 
day in court provides the persons involved in the procedure more 
satisfaction. 128 For all of its well known faults, the normal 
adversary system brings a sense of appropriateness and closure that 
no administrative substitute achieves. Although, dependency cases 
are heard by a court, so much testimony is presented by 
professional expert testimony that parents and children old enough 
to understand what is happening will be disappointed in how 
different the hearing appears from their model of judicial fact 
fmding. Testimony is summarized and likely cannot be directly 
challenged. Witnesses "testimony" may have been summarized by 
others so that the witness cannot be cross-examined. In short, many 
of the attributes of trials which conventional wisdom suggests lead 
to truth are gone. Parties will frequently leave the hearing with the 
feeling that they did not have a day in court. 
CONCLUSION 
Child placement in dependency cases is difficult work. It can 
be, and often is, done badly. The cost in the emotions of parents, 
their children, and perhaps a number of other potential parents, is 
enormous. There is no evidence that, on balance, the lives of 
children are improved. Though there are wonderful success stories, 
horror stories also abound. The recent Grand Jury report on the 
127. Faust & Ziskin, supra note 1 13, at 32 (reporting on a test by Faust and others). 
128. Bersoff, supra note 101, at 363-68. 
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practice in San Diego is a reminder that failures in the system are 
not obvious and require unusual dedication to document. 
No one relishes the thought of children abused or neglected in 
the homes of uncaring or even sadistic parents. Such images fire 
the imagination and lead to typically American interventionist 
responses. Whether the fmancial and emotional cost of the 
intervention process is worth the price, however, appears at least 
to be an open question. In any event, there is no reason to saddle 
a difficult system with the same form of expertise that caused 
devastating results in the confmement and conservatorship cases. 
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